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I’m honoured by the invitation to write a paper for discussion at this conference. I can’t present a 
measured review of the literature on dualism and challenges to dualism; what follows are 
basically my own thoughts from my own field, science and technology studies (STS).1 Though 
they originate in a specific field, I think they have wider relevance, across the disciplines and 
beyond. I have not aimed at a linear exposition; what follows is a series of chunks which 
interconnect. The important thing, I suppose, is to set up some topics for discussion. 
 
• 
 
Modernity has been characterised in terms of its operation of all sorts of dualisms, so to begin we 
need to think about just which dualism is being challenged. The classic modern dualism is the 
Cartesian split between mind (soul) and body, but this is not the one that is directly challenged in 
STS (though it could be). Instead it is a related dualism of people and things, of the human and 
the nonhuman, and this is what I will focus on. The basic idea is that not only do we (moderns) 
distinguish between people and things but that we further seek to understand them separately as 
two realms different in kind. The natural sciences take as their referent a world of things from 
which people are notably absent. Physics and chemistry would be paradigmatic examples of this, 
                                            
1 More specifically, what follows draws inspiration from what I call the posthumanist wing of STS, for 
example Latour (1987, 1993), Haraway (2003, 2004), Pickering (1995a). For the initial break between 
humanist and posthumanist STS, see Pickering (1992), and for an overview of posthumanist studies, 
Pickering (forthcoming a). 
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and not much more needs to be said about them. The social sciences and humanities take as their 
object a world of people in which things are marginalised, to say the least. I think here of 
Durkheim’s construction of sociology as a discipline, though much the same could be said of a 
much wider range of approaches.2 Durkheim defined the proper object of sociology as ‘the 
social,’ understood as irreducible to the proper objects of any other discipline (psychology, 
economics, physics, whatever), and he also insisted that like causes like: in this case, that social 
effects have social causes. Here we have a prescription for talking only about people and never 
about things. Of course, apparently non-social things are not as elegantly avoidable in the social 
sciences as social ones are in the natural sciences, but they are easily defanged by an insistence 
that we have no access to things in themselves but only to their meanings for us—themselves 
securely within the realm of the social. Hence a classical sociology of the supernatural (religion), 
of the natural (science) and of knowledge in general. 
 
This duality of people and things is manifest in disciplinary and departmental identities across the 
university and goes deeply into modern commonsense. In STS it was manifest in the early 
sociology of science developed by Robert Merton et al, which focussed on the social norms of 
scientific conduct rather than, say, the substance of scientific knowledge and practice. A similar 
disciplinary allegiance was evident in the sociology of scientific knowledge as it developed in the 
1970s.3 While dismissing the Mertonian approach as a ‘sociology of scientists’ which failed to 
address the substance of science, still SSK offered a distinctly dualist account centred on the 
social causes of scientific beliefs. Nevertheless, this bifurcation between people and things was 
the key dualism to be challenged in STS from the mid-1980s onwards. More on this below, but I 
can say now that the challenge centres on the interface between these putatively different 
realms—a zone whose existence is implicitly denied by the modern disciplines. It began with a 
focus on practice, the place where the human and nonhuman engage one another on a more or 
less symmetric footing (Pickering 1992, 1995a). 
 
• 
 
                                            
2 In a North American context one has only to skim the leading social science journals to be convinced of 
this and conversation with a wide variety of academics persuades me of it. This is not to say that one cannot 
find approaches that do not follow the Durkheimian blueprint, including, of course, the posthumanist 
variants of STS that concern me here. 
3 See the canonical texts of Barry Barnes, David Bloor, Harry Collins and Steven Shapin. 
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Bruno Latour (1993) offers an unusual insight into modernity which connects it directly to the 
history of science and technology. He associates modernity with precisely the dualism of people 
and things, and asserts almost paradoxically that ‘we have never been modern.’ I want to explore 
this idea, which I think is important. What does it mean? Latour’s own exegesis is, I would say, 
ontological.4 His idea is that the building blocks of the world are themselves non-dualist hybrids 
of the human and the nonhuman—global warming, say, grasped not as an unequivocal fact (or 
not) about the world, but as an assemblage of human and social concerns, of scientific 
instruments, observations, experiments and computer simulations, of the almost unprecedented 
heat in Berlin as I write (July 2006), and so on. The world always has been and always will be 
populated by such hybrids, evolving and churning together (Callon and Latour 1981). From this 
perspective, what characterises modernity is that we learned how not to see this, that the 
academic disciplines found ways to purify themselves and their objects, each taking bits of either 
the human or the nonhuman as their subject matter, but never both. We learned, as I would say, to 
read the world against the grain—to conceptualise it, not as it appears, but in a quite non-intuitive 
way in terms of a reality behind the scenes. Of course, over the centuries our intuitions have 
changed, so that what was once bold, radical and refreshing has turned into the dead weight of 
commonsense and departmental labels. 
 
This all sounds right to me, to a first approximation. But there are two points I would like to add. 
First, dualism is not simply an ideology; it is not simply a redescription of what will always be 
the case. It has practical consequences. Taking dualism to heart has meant both thinking and 
acting differently in the world. Latour argues that our modern dualist way of thinking speeds up 
the proliferation of hybrids—if we cannot get the coupling of people and things into focus we 
won’t worry all the time about the social or spiritual aspects of major civil engineering projects, 
say. We can just get on with building some enormous dam in the Third World, and allow 
ourselves to be surprised (yet again) when some social catastrophe later becomes apparent. But 
more is at stake in modernity than simple acceleration. Physics and chemistry are not alchemy 
redescribed; they are very different sciences, incommensurable with their premodern cognates. 
And their incommensurability resides precisely at the level of their different ontological visions: 
modern physics speaks of things (quarks or whatever), while alchemy explicitly dwelt on an 
entanglement of the material, social and spiritual aspects of the alchemical work: in purifying 
matter the alchemist at once purified himself spiritually and vice versa. In Kuhn’s famous phrase, 
                                            
4 I read Latour’s work this way, though at key points he and the other actor-network theorists tend to speak 
instead of semiotics (see Pickering 1995a, ch 1). 
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the alchemists and modern physicists lived or live in different worlds, and I want to suggest that 
this has consequences for how we act. Ontology makes a difference. 
 
Second, not all sciences in fact display and elaborate a dualist ontology. In the shadows of the 
modern one can always find the nonmodern. There are still alchemists, for example, and, as 
another example, the post-1960s New Age movement rejects any clean separation of the human 
and the nonhuman (or of the body, mind and spirit). I find it significant that, just like alchemy in 
the Scientific Revolution, in academic circles today New Age is almost universally reviled, 
ridiculed and walled-off—to speak of it without irony is to invite strange looks and expressions of 
contempt. And this is just one symptom of a much wider phenomenon, a more or less moralised 
dismissal of the non-modern by the modern. So if the dualism of the human and the nonhuman 
has not absolutely taken over our life-worlds—it is, indeed, still possible to question it—still, it 
exerts some sort of a hegemony over not only the practice but also the imaginations of many of 
us. My recent research has led me to an interest in the wilder fringes of 60s culture as another 
explicitly nonmodern, nondualist, formation. But try talking about explorations of consciousness 
and LSD trips to a scholarly audience without feeling that you are beyond the pale of polite 
society. 
 
That is why it might be strategic to focus on more respectable non-dualist formations closer to 
science and engineering and the heartlands of modernity. These exist, too. In studying macro-
transformations of science, technology and society around WWII I became very interested in 
what I called cyborg sciences and cyborg objects (Pickering 1995b). The former are sciences that 
don’t share the ontological purity of the modern sciences. Operations research (OR), for example, 
originated as a science of the conjoint performance of men and weapons systems. The 
paradigmatic cyborg science, cybernetics, emerged as a science of the brain based on lively and 
adaptive electromechanical systems—cyborg objects that blurred the boundaries between the 
animate and the inanimate, the human and the nonhuman, mind and body. Cybernetics is visibly 
the precursor of some of the most interesting work in contemporary robotics, brain science and 
complexity theory. It is much less easy to dismiss than New Age—though still people do so, on 
the basis of a few dimly remembered historical cliches. 
 
• 
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I should slow down. I have been elaborating Latour’s idea that we have never been modern, but 
how did STS arrive at this position? The answer is: in its explorations in the heart of modernity 
and its discovery that a dualist perspective does not work even for modern science itself. To see 
how this goes, we need an example to think about, which is not so easy to provide since a proper 
discussion would require much more documentation, technical background and analysis than is 
possible here. Instead, let me just point to some key features from one of my own studies, of 
Donald Glaser’s Nobel Prize winning development of the bubble chamber as a key instrument in 
the detection of elementary particles (Pickering 1993, 1995, ch 2). 
 
The key notion here is that of modelling. In the early 1950s, Glaser conceived the plan of building 
a new instrument that was modelled on an existing one, the cloud chamber—meaning a device 
that was somehow like the cloud chamber but differed from it in some way that was not 
determined in advance. This is the sense I need of modelling: an open-ended extension of that 
which already exists, along a vector which only gets fixed in future practice. For Glaser, this 
meant trying out all sorts of variants of the cloud chamber, all of which failed except one which 
worked. This was a small glass container, filled not with a saturated vapour (the cloud chamber) 
but with a liquid at the point of boiling—this was his prototypical bubble chamber. 
 
This was by no means the end of the bubble-chamber story but I can note first that in this instance 
Glaser’s practice amounted to a trial-and-error search through a space of material performance 
and agency, finding out what different set-ups would do. I can remark, second, that here he was 
dealing with emergent properties of matter in a fundamental and irreducible sense. There was no 
way of knowing in advance which set-up would succeed and which would fail, nothing in 
advance of his practice determined or caused or explained the success of his prototype bubble 
chambers. Of course, some knowledge of bubble-formation was intrinsic to Glaser’s practice, but 
one can document the fact that this knowledge was itself revisable in practice; in fact, at a key 
point Glaser completely changed his mathematical model of bubble-formation in the light of what 
his chamber turned out to do. His knowledge of bubbles can thus be seen as modelled on earlier 
knowledge, but again in an open-ended fashion, and the particular vector of evolution of this 
modelling was structured by its intersection with the particular vector along which Glaser’s 
chambers and their material performances evolved. We could say that the material and conceptual 
strata of the culture of physics evolved together here, and this is already a non-dualist point if we 
think of knowledge as distinctly human and the formation of bubbles (as particle tracks) as 
nonhuman.
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The story goes on. Glaser wanted to use his new detector in cosmic-ray physics and again he 
explored a space of material performance, once more transforming his prototype chamber in an 
open-ended fashion, trying in various ways to trigger the chamber on the passage of cosmic-ray 
showers. None of these worked, and Glaser revised his goal, deciding to try to insert his device 
into accelerator-based rather than cosmic-ray physics. This entailed further searches in the space 
of material agency and also, interestingly, a transformation of the social contours of Glaser’s 
practice. Originally working in a classical small-science mode (with the assistance of a single 
graduate student), Glaser drifted towards big science, ending up as the leader of a fourteen-man 
team. This was an entirely unintended outcome (as was the move into accelerator physics—
Glaser didn’t like to collaborate), and we can again think of an open-ended extension of the social 
relations of scientific research, with the contours of Glaser’s human organisation evolving 
alongside and in relation to the performances of his chambers. 
 
We thus arrive at a picture of the open-ended becoming of the material, social and conceptual 
strata of Glaser’s project, with each stratum growing out of its earlier form along vectors that 
were not given in terms of any pure inner dynamics but in relation to the becoming of other strata. 
The material, social and conceptual aspects of the project eventually and temporarily hung 
together and interactively stabilised one another in the utility of Glaser’s quenched xenon 
chamber (one of the first chambers of practical use in elementary-particle research). 
 
This is a simple and straightforward historical story—some possibly more gripping ones follow—
that serves to bring home the idea that we have never been modern. Modern physics is constituted 
as a modern discourse that presumes and elaborates a duality of people and things, yet the 
practice of physics itself challenges any dualist analysis (as I defined it earlier). To understand the 
social transformations around Glaser’s project—the displacement of his goals, changes of scale in 
the social structure of his group—it is no use appealing to the Durkheimian idea that like causes 
like. One has instead to look to the unlike and heterogeneous: the becoming of the social was here 
coupled to the becoming of a machine and its powers (and vice versa). This is the basic sense in 
which studies in STS present challenges to the modern dualism of the human and the nonhuman. 
 
• 
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There is more to be said: we could think about dualism from another angle here, having to do 
with products rather than practices. I have described Glaser’s practice in bubble-chamber 
development as a dance of human and nonhuman agency which appeared symmetrically as an 
alternation betweeen activity and passivity (Fleck 1979). If we begin with Glaser, we could say 
that in his work on the bubble chamber, he was often an active agent, disposing elements in a 
passive material world as he thought fit. But it is important to note that once he had configured 
his latest chamber set-up he became passive, standing back to watch what this set-up would do 
(literally, with a high-speed movie camera in his hand). He had to find out how each set-up would 
perform, and he would then revise his plans for the next set-up, and so on. We could thus say that 
human and nonhuman agency intertwined in a decentred fashion in constituting the history of the 
bubble chamber, but I want to dwell on a different point now.5 
 
To speak of this alternation of activity and passivity between the human and the nonhuman is to 
point to an important characteristic of modern science and engineering. The important thing about 
the bubble chamber, like the cloud chamber before it, was that it should perform independently of 
its creator. Glaser put the pieces together, but the chamber had to produce particle tracks on its 
own without any human intervention from Glaser or anyone else.6 And something rather general 
surfaces here, I suspect. So many of the instruments and machines that inhabit and emanate from 
modern science and engineering have this property of acting independently of us (unless they are 
‘broken’). The great thing about a car or a TV set is that it moves us around or shows us pictures 
with no effort on our part. I think of this as a practical dualism of people and things—a 
separation in practice between human agents having certain powers and free-standing machines 
having different ones. 
 
I said above that dualism was more than an ideology, and I suggested that it was instead 
consequential for the kinds of knowledge we produce and the overall ontological vision in which 
that knowledge is set. But now we can see a particular material consequentiality, too. Modern 
scientific and engineering practice is organised around the production of free-standing machines 
as a dualist telos. It continually refigures and populates the material world with products—
                                            
5 One can imagine all sorts of modes of decentring of the human. More often discussed is a decentring of 
the individual in language and discourse, so it might be worth emphasising that the latter is different from 
the one that interests me here. It remains, to my way of thinking, within the humanist/dualist orbit. 
6 This observation connects directly to Daston and Galison’s (1992) analysis of the history of a machine-
dependent form of scientific objectivity. 
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devices, gadgets, machines—that function as a sort of ontological theatre, staging before our very 
eyes a separation of the human and the nonhuman. 
 
What should we make of this? First, we should be impressed. Our ability to remake the material 
world in this dualist fashion, only really evident since the Industrial Revolution, is truly amazing. 
We need to take this seriously. Second, we should not be over-impressed. What I just called ‘our 
ability’ is distinctly finite; many unintended products of our dualist ‘mastery’ of nature are 
coming back to haunt us—as discussed further below. But third, the point I wish to emphasise 
now: most of us now live most of our lives in a fabricated environment that is saturated with the 
products of dualist science and engineering. Our material worlds stage for us this practical duality 
of people and things over and over again, and this must have a lot to do with the hegemony of 
dualism over our imaginations more generally. I rely on the uncanny and very nonhuman powers 
of this computer in front of me to write this essay, to get bits of information I need for it quickly, 
to keep in touch with the organisers of this meeting. The town I live in is built on a Cartesian grid. 
When I travel, I just sit uncomfortably in a plane which moves me through empty and featureless 
Cartesian space to another airport. Time is linearised and standardised. In a material world like 
this, it is not surprising that dualism is the natural ontological attitude. 
 
If one were serious about challenging dualism, them, one would have to think about re-
engineering the built environment and staging new forms of ontological theatre. Writing papers 
would probably not be enough. 
 
• 
 
I want to return to questions of ontology. The bubble chamber story suggests that more is at stake 
than the question of dualism. I have deliberately been speaking about cultural evolution in 
describing Glaser’s practice. If one stays with the visible, the picture that emerges is literally an 
evolutionary one, populated by entities—material technology, bodies of knowledge, social 
relations and structures—that sport and mutate just like biological species, along historical 
trajectories marked by relations to other entities that are themselves mutating and becoming. This 
quasi-organic ontology, where open-ended change and search in a space of multiplicity is the 
norm, is one of the key upshots of science and technology studies.7 I understand the challenge to 
                                            
7 In philosophy, one thinks here of the work of William James, Alfred North Whitehead and Gilles 
Deleuze, and the more recent work of Isabelle Stengers. 
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dualism, for example, as just one corollary of it, arising in instances whenever the co-evolving 
elements span the human/nonhuman divide. Such instances obviously come up often when 
science and technology are at stake, but formally they have no special quality to distinguish them 
from instances in which the elements belong to some homogeneous set (eg my discussion of 
Hamilton’s mathematics: Pickering 1995a, ch 4). Another contrast with the modern disciplines 
thus surfaces here, inasmuch as the disciplines characteristically speak a language of fixed and 
regular— ‘mechanical’ or ‘dead’—entities and relations (quarks, quantum field theory).8 
 
• 
 
 
 
MONDRIAN 
 
 
                                            
8 These remarks on multiplicity and emergence link the present essay directly to the topics of the first two 
meetings in this series, reductionism and determinism. Evidently the topics of all three meetings 
interconnect. Canguilhem (2005) notes the different ontologies espoused by scientists and historians of 
science—one fixed, the other fluid—but does not develop this observation, treating it as simply a fact about 
the two camps. I thank Hans-Jörg Rheinberger for bringing this essay to my attention. 
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DE KOONING 
 
 
I want to go back to the question of how our material environment either reinforces or challenges 
our dualist prejudices, and I find it useful here to contrast the works of two of the 20th century’s 
great painters, Piet Mondrian and Willem de Kooning. I want to align Mondrian with a dualist 
modernity and de Kooning with a nondualist nonmodernity. There are complications here if one 
explores these artists’ intentions, but I want to focus on their material artworks understood as 
ontological theatre in the sense used above. 
 
First, I want to say that Mondrian’s most famous images stage a version of a dualist ontology, 
though a strongly asymmetric one, different in that respect from Glaser’s bubble chambers. 
Glaser’s chambers elide the decentred dance of agency from which they emerged in the 
autonomous quality of their own performance, and they thus encourage us not to think about the 
human steps in the dance. Mondrian’s paintings instead conjure up an ontology in which humans 
are the only genuine agents. Looking at his paintings, it is easy to imagine Mondrian projecting a 
preconceived image onto the canvas as a purely passive substrate—the black lines go here and 
here on a Cartesian grid; the flat primary colours fill in this space or that. All that intervenes 
between the image in the artist’s mind and the finished picture is a source of error—smudges 
have to painted over. There is also no sense of time and change to be gained from Mondrian, no 
sense of evolution and becoming, no sense that it mattered whether he filled in the red, yellow or 
blue areas first, say. 
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When we turn to de Kooning the picture changes, literally. One cannot imagine de Kooning 
planning out in advance images like that shown above and then materialising them on a passive 
substrate of paint and canvas. We have to see his paintings as a decentred joint product of the 
artist, the paints and the canvas, emerging in an essentially temporal process, a back and forth, a 
dance of agency, between the artist and his materials. de Kooning messed about with his paints to 
see what would turn up, in an open-ended search for beauty, with no predetermined end-point. 
 
I want to see these paintings, then, as ontological icons, echoing back to us very different 
ontologies. Like the knowledge and machines of modern science and engineering, Mondrian’s 
paintings conjure up a static, and in this case, asymmetric duality of people and things, where all 
the agency lies with the former. de Kooning’s paintings instead evoke a symmetric and decentred 
non-dualist world of becoming in a space of multiplicity; they thematise process without any 
given telos. On a material plane, any real challenge to dualism would, I think, entail populating 
our world with more de Koonings and fewer Mondrians. 
 
• 
 
I can extend the discussion of Mondrian and de Kooning in another direction. In his famous essay 
‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ Martin Heidegger (1976) characterised modernity as a 
project of enframing the world, dominating it and turning it into ‘standing reserve’ for human 
projects. One of his examples was a power station straddling the Rhine, reducing this historically 
charged geography to a simple source of electricity for factories. Enframing clearly hangs 
together with the asymmetric dualist ontology staged by Mondrian’s paintings, and we could take 
them in turn as icons that remind us of enframing more generally—bending a passive world, here 
of canvas and paints, to our will, to our preconceived projects. de Kooning’s paintings would then 
serve as icons for a different ontology, and a different stance in the world, not of enframing but 
what one could call revealing, characterised not by an imposition of human plans and goals, but 
by an openness to what the world has to offer us (for better or for worse). 
 
I think this contrast between stances of enframing and revealing is important. Dualism does not 
necessarily imply domination, but when coupled with an asymmetric attribution of agency to the 
human and the nonhuman, the two terms go together nicely. Part of the hegemony of dualism in 
the present is that enframing seems to have become our natural ontological attitude in our 
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dealings with the material and social worlds. de Kooning’s paintings can serve as reminders that 
we do not have to approach nature in this mode.9 
 
• 
 
My discussion of Glaser and the bubble chamber was intended to exemplify the idea that we have 
never been modern, even in physics, the heartland of modern science. Now I want to extend the 
exemplification to a field of greater worldly significance, engineering. My example here is one 
I’ve talked about before—struggles to control the Mississippi River—though it has a new ending 
since last summer. My principle source is John McPhee’s wonderful book, The Control of Nature 
(1989). 
 
The Mississippi is one of the world’s great rivers. All of the rain that falls in the midwest of the 
US drains through it into the Gulf of Mexico. Prior to European settlement, the lower reaches of 
the Mississippi were marked by natural embankments of sediment about three feet high—
levees—deposited on either side of the waterway. The levees usually served to contain the river, 
though sometimes it would overflow them and inundate an enormous floodplain. It appears that 
the human inhabitants of the area, nomadic Indians, could live with that. But then came the 
European settlers, who began to establish fixed towns—most notably New Orleans as the river’s 
major seaport. With the growth of these towns, the containment of the river became a matter of 
increasing importance, one aspect of which was an artificial raising of the levees to confine the 
river within its banks. What interests me most about this strategy is that it never quite worked. 
 
The theory was that containing the river would make it flow faster, causing it to cut into the 
riverbed and thus to sink relative to the surrounding land. Instead, as the levees rose, the river 
rose as well; flooding continued; the levees had to be raised further, and so on, back and forth. In 
the end New Orleans became a walled city, surrounded by a ring of earthworks thirty feet high. 
McPhee compared it to the walled cities of the Middle Ages, though the enemy now was water, 
not the humans beyond the walls. 
 
                                            
9 Note that one should not see Glaser’s work on the bubble chamber simply as enframing nature. Much of 
scientific and engineering research has more the character of revealing, albeit a peculiar form of revealing 
structured by the telos of separating the human from the nonhuman and the retrospective veiling of the 
emergence of novelty. 
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For the past century and a half, responsibility for controlling the river has been assigned to the US 
Army Corps of Engineers, the ACE, which describes its work as a battle with the Mississippi—a 
battle in which the levees are central and whose outcome is far from certain. It turns out that the 
Mississippi wants to move. It is now, for example, thirty feet above one of the lesser rivers it 
feeds into, the Atchafalaya. Left to itself, the entire Mississippi would spill into the Atchafalaya, 
reaching the Gulf a couple of hundred miles west of its present destination, and leaving the 
existing lower reaches of the Mississippi a mere trickle. But cities like New Orleans rely on the 
river water in all sorts of ways, and the Army has accordingly been fighting the Atchafalaya for 
decades, reengineering its intersection with the Mississippi. 
 
In 1963 a massive 250,000 ton sill or weir became operational, designed to control the runoff 
from the Mississippi into the Atchafalaya and to prevent it exceeding its prior rate of around 30%. 
In the floods of 1972 and 1973, the control structure held, just. If it had failed, the Mississippi 
would have changed course irrevocably. After the flood, inspections revealed that the structure 
had suffered massive damage. Part of it had just gone: turbulent flows had excavated holes as big 
as football stadiums around it. Despite massive repairs, it would never meet its design 
specifications again. The original control project had cost $86M; after 1973, a new Auxiliary 
Structure was added at a cost of $300M, consisting of six gates, each 62 feet wide and together 
weighing 2,600 tons. McPhee quotes an engineer on the new project as saying at the time ‘I hope 
it works’ (52). 
 
Now, of course, we know that it didn’t work, though it wasn’t a flood coming down from the 
midwest that defeated the ACE in 2005, it was hurricane Katrina. The control structures are still 
there; the levees broke instead. New Orleans experienced a massive flood, enormous amounts of 
property were destroyed, many people died, hundreds of thousands remain homeless—nomads, 
one might say, like the Indians before them, but involuntary ones this time. 
 
How should we think about this story? First, it challenges dualist understandings in much the 
same way as did the story of Glaser and the bubble chamber, but on more obviously important 
and less rarefied terrain. The story of our struggles with the Mississippi is another example of the 
decentred dance of agency that STS found first in the scientific laboratory—an active/passive 
open-ended back and forth between the river and the engineers. Second, also as before, the story 
shows that dualism has real-world consequences; it should not be understood as mere ideology. 
The ACE’s struggle was precisely to impose a modernist and dualist spine on the dance of 
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agency, to bend the river to human will, to enframe it—to keep it to its existing course, to stop it 
overflowing its banks, to allow New Orleans to exist without change. The fantasy that this is 
possible goes with the sort of asymmetric dualism I just associated with Mondrian’s paintings, 
which is why this history of engineering can be described as distinctly modern and dualist. But 
third, something new appears here. 
 
• 
 
I want to make the obvious point: New Orleans and Katrina stage for us the fact that the other 
side and probably a necessary corollary of enframing is catastrophic failure and disaster. In one 
sense, this is obvious. Wolfgang Schivelbusch (1986) talks about the increase in ‘falling height’ 
that accompanied the development of railway travel in the 19th century: so much energy was 
bound up in a fast moving train that railway smash-ups were so much more devastating than 
stage-coach crashes in the pre-rail era.10 We all know that. And yet . . . 
 
I first began thinking about the Mississippi, New Orleans and the ACE around 2001. I could see 
that the historical story exemplified an emergent dance of agency, but that it was orchestrated 
around an asymmetrically dualist attempt to enframe the river—the idea that the river could 
indeed be dominated. And one sunny afternoon in Urbana, I asked myself so what? What follows 
from seeing things this way? And the answer that popped into my mind was: we don’t need to 
enframe the river; no-one says we have to; we should let New Orleans go. More precisely, we 
should at least let its residents have an easy option of moving out of the city at a time of calm 
when water-levels were low (instead of when they were creeping inexorably up the levees). And 
three points are worth making here. First, I laughed out loud when this thought came to me—just 
because it was so crazy and surprising; it was a quite singular thought for me. Second, for once in 
my life I was right. Third, despite the destruction of New Orleans, I have yet to find any evidence 
for anyone else seeing the point. In the US, the principal reactions to Katrina have been (a) to 
blame the ACE for failing to enframe the river, and (b) to move the population back into New 
Orleans as fast as possible. 
 
So, if my point about disaster as the other side of enframing seems trite in the abstract, in this 
particular instance it has nevertheless eluded the population of America—including, I should 
                                            
10 I thank Schivelbusch for a brief but enlightening on the present topic. He told me that ‘falling height’ is 
just a bad translation from the German for ‘potential energy,’ but this odd phrase has stuck in my mind. 
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emphasise, academics and scholars: the natural scientists and engineers have concerned 
themselves with questions of what went wrong with the levees and how the river can be enframed 
better in the future; social scientists have focussed more on what Katrina can tell us about race 
relations in the US. Even massive death and destruction, then, have failed to dent an asymmetric 
dualism, an image of a dominatable nature entirely lacking in any conception of becoming and 
the dance of agency. This is a striking instance, I think, of both the spectacular hegemony of 
dualism over our practices and imagination and of the baneful consequences of that. 
 
How can we think our way out of a grim, desperate, joyless, nail-biting, repetitive, boring and 
fabulously expensive attempt to keep New Orleans the same? On the one hand, we could enrich 
our imaginations. If our ontology was the quasi-organic, non-dualist one that has grown out of 
science and technology studies, enframing the Mississippi would appear much less plausible than 
it presently does. On the other hand, it might help to recognise that, if the ACE’s approach to 
managing the environment is distinctively modern, well, as always, there are also non-modern 
engineering approaches to that field too, approaches that adopt a stance more of revealing than 
enframing. In the US, for example, there is a field called adaptive environmental management, 
that Lisa Asplen (forthcoming) has written about very nicely. If the ACE acts in a command-and-
control mode, as Asplen calls it, adaptive management tries instead to pay attention to what rivers 
want to do. Its stance towards nature is experimental. Asplen gives the example of experimental 
floods staged on the Colorado River, in which scientists monitor the ecological transformations 
that occur when large quantities of water are released from an upstream dam—as a way of 
exploring the possibilities for environmental management, rather than simply trying to dictate to 
nature what it will look like. I want to say that adaptive management exemplifies a stance of 
revealing rather than enframing—it is alert to unexpected possibilities as well as dangers—and it 
stages a nonmodern ontology for us. It shows us what a recognition of our ontological condition 
might look like as engineering; and, in comparison with the works of the ACE, it demonstrates 
that ontology makes a difference: real world projects look very different depending on whether 
they stage a modern or a nonmodern ontology. I could also add that adaptive management 
promises to be robust, relative to the obvious fragility of modern command and control; the scope 
for massive failure of the latter just isn’t there in an experimental relation to nature.11 
                                            
11 There is a subtlety that needs to be thought through here, since experiment is clearly central to the 
modern sciences themselves. We can see these sciences as operating a detour away from and back to the 
world as found, isolating specific segments of the world and producing knowledge of them in small-scale 
laboratory experiments which can then be transferred back to the world in the fashion of enframing, 
Latour’s (1983) old essay on Pasteur and anthrax remains the canonical study of this manoeuvre. Latour 
SUNY-1106.doc 16 
 
• 
 
I want to say that there is something political at stake in the contrast between enframing and 
revealing, though perhaps sub-political might be a better word. Whether to adopt one stance or 
another is a choice about how we live our lives. One acts out a stance of dualist domination which 
is more and more haunted by quite justified fears of disaster; the other recognises that we are not 
at the centre of history and always expects the unexpected, without expecting the unexpected to 
be necessarily bad. If we seriously realised that we have this choice, I don’t think the choice itself 
would be difficult. 
 
Along with notions of politics go ideas of power. The asymmetric dualism I have been focussing 
on goes with a linear notion of power—command-and-control, as I just called it. A chain of 
command in which commands are always obeyed and nothing ever travels back up the hierarchy. 
I doubt whether any real instance of this kind of power has ever be seen, but like the basic 
dualism with which we began, the very idea is consequential—all sorts of engineering and social 
systems attempt to instantiate it and make it come true. A nonmodern ontology of open-ended 
becoming, in contrast, points to a surrender of dreams of that sort of power which, in fact, we can 
never have. It points towards a very extended sense of democracy, of a necessary interest in and 
respect for an uncontrollable other, human or nonhuman. This is what Donna Haraway (2003) 
means by love in her recent book on relations between people and dogs. 
 
• 
 
I should take stock again of where we have got to. I have been meditating on Latour’s idea that 
we have never been modern, where modernity is defined as operating a dualism of people and 
things. Against that dualism, I have proposed a different binary classification. I think we can 
crudely carve up the world into two blocs of practices and products. One is itself modern and 
plays out a dualist ontology before our eyes. My examples have been from physics (Glaser and 
the bubble chamber) and engineering (the ACE and the Mississippi), and I have also read 
Mondrian’s paintings as icons of duality from the artworld. The other is nonmodern, staging a 
                                                                                                                                  
does not, however, discuss the fact that sometimes this tactic works and sometimes it fails (as in the Katrina 
example). The sense of ‘experiment’ I need in the above paragraph is that of experimenting on the thing 
itself (here the Colorado River) without any detour through the laboratory—experiment as revealing rather 
than a step towards enframing. 
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non-dualist ontology—exemplified thus far by adaptive environmental management and in de 
Kooning’s paintings.12  
 
One sense in which we have never been modern is this complicated one: the discovery that 
modernist formations, like physics or civil engineering, fail to exemplify their own ontology. It 
turns out that they themselves grow in a nonmodern, quasi-organic fashion. But it also turns out 
that their modernity is nevertheless consequential. They are organised around the production of 
dualist artefacts: bodies of knowledge that speak to us of a clean split and essential difference 
between people and things; free-standing machines that evoke a notion of nonhuman agency quite 
independent of us. The modern sciences and engineering aim, at least, at making the world more 
dual than when they found it. We could say that this dualism is less a reflection on the world than 
a particular strategy for transforming it. 
 
The second sense in which we have never been modern is the simple observation that there are 
and always have been nonmodern cultural strata of the kind just mentioned—ways of going on 
that quite literally have never been modern. 
 
If I had to produce a crude cultural map, it would feature a small circle. Within it, we would find 
the modern, dualist, practices and artefacts; outside it, and stretching off as far as the eye could 
see, would be the nonmodern. The eruption of modernity into this small circle must have once 
been a wonderful and liberating thing. But we live in a time when it seems increasingly difficult 
to recognise anything outside the circle. Even more so than fifty years ago, say, the nonmodern is 
reviled, trivialised, condemned or, of course, simply ignored, rendered non-existent, negated, 
nullified. 
 
Politics again. So what? I think that much of the grimness of the early 21st century hangs together 
with the domination of our imaginations by a dead dualism. I can easily imagine a world I would 
rather live in, that would hang together with the nonmodern ontology I have been contrasting with 
it. Is the political prescription then to stamp out dualism, to eradicate modernity, to erase that 
small circle in the middle of the map? I don’t think so. Modernity was wonderful once and it 
                                            
12 My objection to the dualism of the human and the nonhuman centres on the modern practice of theorising 
them separately. In contrast, I have no interest in offering different accounts of the modern and the 
nonmodern. I’m sure we could offer isomorphous accounts of the evolution of, say, Mondrian and de 
Kooning’s painting styles, or of cybernetics and modern physics. One can also easily populate a confused 
middle ground between modern and nonmodern practices and products. My instinct, however, is that to 
break the spell of human/nonhuman duality it is best to look at examples that are as far from it as possible. 
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could be again. What we need to do though is to contest its hegemony so that we can see clearly 
and immediately that we have other options than, iconically, fighting the Mississippi forever in 
the name of New Orleans. What we need, I think, is a gestalt switch, one of those figure/ground 
reversals, so that we can take the nonmodern, as well as the modern, seriously, while shrinking 
the modern back to the size it really is—a small circle, not necessarily in the middle of the map, 
and not necessarily the best judge of what lies outside it. Enframing as a desperate gambit, not the 
only option. Revealing as possible. 
 
How is the gestalt switch to be accomplished? I know of no magic recipe. Norwood Russell 
Hansen (1958, ch 1) once offered a nice description of this process in relation to the gestalt 
figures beloved of experimental psychologists, the duck/rabbit, the old woman/young girl. If 
people just can’t see one or the other of the images, you can only gesture around them, pointing at 
splodges that are meaningless in one gestalt but significant in the other, explaining how these 
splodges fit together and what they are in relation to the whole picture. In the end, people either 
get it or they don’t.13 I want to attempt something along those lines now, trying to assemble a 
range of instances as elements of a wider non-dualist gestalt that one could take seriously and 
live, and along the way I want to point out some important contrasts between this and the modern 
dualist gestalt, especially along the enframing/revealing axis. Most of the examples, I could say, 
derive from my studies of the history of cybernetics (Pickering forthcoming b). 
 
• 
 
Mathematics, physics, biology . . . 
We can start with science itself. If modern physics, say, conjures up for us a knowable, calculable 
and, in principle, predictable and enframable world, the sciences of complexity evoke a different 
vision, of a world of systems which we cannot control and will always surprise us in their 
behaviour. I can briefly sketch out a couple of examples. 
 
Cellular automata are mathematical systems. A one-dimensional CA is a sequence of points on a 
line, where each point can be assigned a value of 0 or 1. One thinks of the system as evolving in a 
series of discrete time-steps, with a transformation rule giving the value at any point in terms of 
                                            
13 Hanson’s most memorable example is a picture that almost everyone first sees as a random collection of 
black splodges on a white ground. Hanson’s caption instructs one to try to see specific splodges as the 
shadow of an ear, a beard, and so on. Soon enough the head and shoulders of Christ become clearly 
apparent. 
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its value at the previous step and those of its neighbours. Stephen Wolfram (2002) argues that 
such systems show that even the simplest of rules can generate endless complexity in the 
behaviour of the system over time. His Principle of Computational Irreducibility states that for 
some of these systems there are no scientific ‘short cuts’—if one wants to know how they evolve 
over time, there is no better method than to simply iterate the transformation rule over and over 
again and find out. 
 
We could think of these CAs as nonmodern ontological icons, in the spirit of de Kooning’s 
paintings. Though they do not speak directly to questions of dualism, they are simple models of 
what I have been calling becoming. One never knows what they will do next in advance of them 
actually doing it. Wolfram himself ontologises this picture, arguing that the world is built from 
CA-like systems (rather than the predictable entities of which mainstream physics speaks): even 
space, time and causality emerge from discrete systems that themselves lack these qualities. 
 
If we followed Wolfram in imagining the world as built from such entities, projects of enframing 
would appear as implausible in the extreme. One cannot command a system that continually 
changes in unpredictable ways. One can only get along with and adapt to it as best one can. The 
stance that I called revealing, in contrast, would be entirely appropriate—an alertness to what the 
system might offer us. 
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RULE 30 CELLULAR AUTOMATON 
The tranformation rule is shown at the bottom. The value assigned to any point is a function of its 
value and those of its two nearest neighbours at the previous time-step. 
 
If Wolfram’s CAs can enrich our imagination of a world of becoming, Stuart Kauffman’s (1995, 
2002) idealised networks of genes in theoretical biology can enrich our notions of control and 
power along a similarly nonmodern axis. In the mid-1960s, Kauffman began experimenting with 
computer simulations of such networks which were also, in effect, CAs. Sites on a lattice could 
again take on the values of 0 or 1, and some simple rules determined the evolution of the array of 
these values in discrete time-steps. Kauffman found that if each site was connected to just two 
others by the rule, then such systems had very interesting emergent properties, independent of the 
details of the rule. It would appear a priori that such systems might behave in an astronomical 
number of different ways, depending on the initial conditions. In fact, Kauffman’s simulations 
settled down quickly to running through some small number of repetitive cycles. More 
interestingly here, Kauffman experimented with interfering with these cycles—flipping the value 
at some site from 0 to 1 or vice versa at a given time-step and seeing what would happen. He 
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found that often this interference had no effect—the system would return to its existing cycle—
but occasionally the upshot would be to tip the whole system into another of its cycles. 
 
We can read Kauffman’s simulations as ontological theatre, too. They stage for us a nonmodern 
world, with which one can interfere—flipping site values—but without any necessarily 
determinate and predictable effect: Kauffman had no way of knowing in advance what the upshot 
of his interference would be, whether the system would return to its initial cycle or, if not, which 
new cycle it would move into. Here again we have a mathematical model of a world in which 
command-and-control simply makes no sense; a world of entities that, again, one would have to 
learn to adapt to and get along with. Kauffman’s simulations, like Wolfram’s CAs, help boost an 
ontological vision of a world in which revealing and symmetric adaptation rather than enframing 
would be the natural ontological attitude. 
 
We can note also some of the tensions that surround these nonmodern sciences, as we could call 
them. Wise and Brock (1998, 386) quote remarks on complexity from orthodox physicists at a 
meeting at Princeton University in 1996: ‘One really can’t help feeling childish fascination 
looking at this picture of different beautiful systems. But switching to my adult mode, I start 
thinking about what I can really do as a theorist apart from going to my kitchen and trying to 
repeat these experiments;’ ‘It seems to me that you are viewing the patterns in non-equilibrium 
systems like a zoo, where we view one animal at a time, admire it and describe it, and then go on 
to the next animal.’ The opposition between ‘adult’ and the string child-kitchen-zoo is interesting 
many ways but, at least, it registers the difficulty that modern scientists have in taking seriously 
what lies outside the modern circle, and functions as a warning to others not to venture beyond 
it—if they do so, they stand a good chance of losing credibility in mainstream science. This is a 
small token of the hegemony of the modern over our imaginations within science and how it is 
maintained. 
 
• 
 
Brain science, robotics, engineering 
From the 1960s to the 1980s engineering attempts to model the brain were dominated by an 
approach often referred to as symbolic AI. The emphasis was on representing the environment 
and planning ways to achieve particular goals in the space of such representations. An AI robot 
might seek to compute a path across a room that would avoid obstacles, or how to rearrange 
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geometrical blocks, for example. Inasmuch as the technical emphasis was on the manipulation of 
symbols as a model of human cognition and as the necessary precursor to action, symbolic AI 
staged a modern and asymmetrically dualist ontology. Agency was located inside the model 
brain, while the world was treated as a passive environment in which the brain’s goals were to be 
accomplished, a place to be enframed. We could also see symbolic AI as staging a primitive 
version of the modern and dualist self, the unitary, autonomous, rational, calculating, purposive 
individual. 
 
Before the 60s and after the 80s, a different approach to the brain and robotics has been visible 
that we could call situated or cybernetic robotics. Cybernetics emerged in and after World War II 
as a science of psychiatry (especially in Britain), focussed on an interest in the brain as a 
performative and adaptive (rather than cognitive) organ, and centred on the construction of 
electromechanical models. I can just mention two, both built in 1948 (Pickering 2002, 2004a). 
 
Grey Walter’s robot ‘tortoises,’ in contrast to AI robots. modelled the performative and adaptive 
rather than the cognitive brain. The machine’s two ‘neurons’ (each consisting of an electronic 
valve, a capacitor and a relay) acted as a switchyard between sensory inputs (a photocell attached 
to the front forks and a contact switch on the body) which enabled the machine to lock onto and 
pursue light sources while navigating around obstacles, without, I should emphasise, the 
construction and manipulation of any centralised representation of the environment. 
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The tortoise, one could say, explored its environment in the mode of revealing, responding to 
whatever it found there. If AI robotics, then, stages for us a dualist vision of a brain that stands 
apart from matter, Walter’s tortoises thematised instead a nondualist vision of the brain as 
integrally engaged with the body and its environment—in the thick of things, one might say, and 
just one part of the action, rather than a detached controller. 
 
One can, of course, detect a residual dualism in Walter’s work. The tortoises were active agents 
while their environments were a fixed and passive array of lights and obstacles. Ross Ashby’s 
early brain models effaced that asymmetry. His homeostat was a device that converted electrical 
inputs to electrical outputs. Inert in isolation, Ashby worked with multi-homeostat set-ups in 
which four units, say, were interconnected with one another. The homeostat’s key feature was 
that it was capable of randomly reconfiguring its internal circuitry if its output current went 
beyond some limit. In multi-unit set-ups, therefore, a given unit might reconfigure itself 
repeatedly until it came into equilibrium with the others—meaning that its output current went to 
zero and returned there under perturbation. The homeostat could thus find a way to adapt and 
come into a kind of dynamic equilibrium with novel environments (mimicking biological 
homeostasis, hence its name), and this was the sense in which it functioned as a brain-analogue 
for Ashby. 
 
What interests me most here is that Ashby used his homeostats to model both the brain and its 
world. In such a configuration, one unit could be said to stand for the brain, while the other three 
stood for its environment. Ashby’s homeostats were thus nondualist in the sense that, first, a 
perfect symmetry obtained between brain- and world-models—both were lively agents—and that, 
second, the inner dynamics of each was structured (not determined) by the other, much like 
Kauffman’s simulations of gene networks 20 years later. Again, a multi-homeostat set-up can 
function as a nondualist ontological icon, helping us imagine more generally a nondualist world 
populated by a co-evolving multiplicity of lively and unpredictable entities and agents. AI echoes 
modernity back to us; the homeostat echoes instead the nonmodern. 
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FOUR-HOMEOSTAT SET-UP 
 
I could add a couple of comments. Ashby’s work around the homeostat as model brain 
foreshadowed the later work on complexity discussed above. Likewise Walter’s robots were 
models for the situated robotics that has come to the fore in computer science since the 1980s, for 
example in Rodney Brooks’ work at MIT (Brooks 1999; Brooks read Walter’s popular 1953 
book, The Living Brain, when he was a schoolboy). We should take Ashby and Walter seriously. 
Nevertheless the tortoises and homeostats were built more or less on an amateur, hobbyist, basis, 
outside Walter and Ashby’s professional work in EEG research and psychiatry. This again speaks 
of a hegemony of the modern. The contemporary resurgence of situated robotics within the 
universities and elsewhere shows that that hegemony is not unbreakable. Complexity, however, 
still sits uneasily within the academic world, often finding its home in unusual places like the 
Santa Fe Institute and Wolfram’s company, Wolfram Research (which produces the Mathematica 
software system). 
 
• 
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Psychiatry 
I mentioned the connection between cybernetics and psychiatry above, and early cybernetic 
psychiatry was distinguished by its conception of the brain as a performative rather than 
representational organ, where its role in performance was in bodily adaptation to novel 
environments. Again, then, this conception of the brain was a non-dualist one, emphasising the 
coupling of the brain to the body and its environment (including other people) rather than its 
special inner properties.14 And a certain view of madness followed from this: madness as failed 
adaptation. The model here was Pavlov’s experiments on cross-conditioning in dogs—when dogs 
were conditioned to respond to different stimuli in contradictory ways, they would display many 
of the symptoms of human mental pathology. Grey Walter was able to elicit similar behaviour in 
his robot tortoises, and Gregory Bateson extended this idea in his famous notion of double binds 
in schizophrenic communication patterns (Bateson et al 1956). A double bind is a situation in 
which there is no satisfactory routine way to go on: the mother who verbally insists on 
demonstrations of love from her child but physically rejects them, was Bateson’s group’s first 
example. 
 
Placed repeatedly in a double bind there is no satisfactory way to proceed, and Bateson suggested 
that the bizarre behaviour of schizophrenics is a response to this. Inspired by the phenomenon of 
spontaneous remission he further hypothesised the existence of a higher level of mental 
adaptation than those exhibited by the tortoise and the homeostat, and that psychotic episodes 
could, in some instances at least, be understood as ‘inner voyages’ from which sufferers might 
emerge with a better undertsanding of themselves and the world than when they departed. 
 
There were several different ways in which Bateson’s ideas could be put into practice—family 
therapy is perhaps the best known today. But they also fed into radical developments in 
psychiatry in the 60s (often misleadingly labelled ‘anti-psychiatry’). In Britain, a distinctly 
Batesonian approach to schizophrenia was developed by the group led by the Glaswegian 
psychiatrist R. D. Laing, at Kingsley Hall in London. At Kingsley Hall, schizophrenics and 
psychiatrists (and artists, dancers and others) lived together in a communal fashion, designed to 
support inner voyages and allow them to reach their conclusion—in contrast to the orthodox 
therapies of electroshock and psycho-active drugs which, from this perspective, had the effect of 
stopping inner voyages in their tracks and leaving patients stuck in their double binds 
 
                                            
14 So here we touch on the classical mind/body dualism. 
SUNY-1106.doc 27 
What strikes me again is the contrast in practice—in life—between the nondualist psychiatry of 
Kingsley Hall and orthodox psychiatry, and one aspect of this contrast can be caught up in the 
notion of power. Unlike Kingsley Hall, which aimed at a fully democratic symmetry between the 
mad and the sane in the organisation of communal life, with the possibility of reciprocal revealing 
and transformation, the canonical mental hospital is a place of dualist enframing, a hierarchical 
institution in which the doctors are the only genuine agents, prescribing therapies (drugs, ECT) to 
patients understood as literally that, passive and subject to the doctor’s will.15 This is, in fact, the 
same contrast as that between the ACE’s stance re nature and adaptive environmental 
management’s, but now between people and people rather than people and things, and in an 
psychiatric rather than engineering register. Again we see that non/dualism makes a big 
difference in practice, in how we go on in the world. 
 
Selves and spirituality 
In his first schizophrenia paper (1956) Bateson made a connection between madness and 
spirituality that echoed through the 60s (see also Huxley 1954, 1956, of course, and before him 
Walter 1953). He pointed to the formal identity of the double bind with the contradictory 
instructions given by a Zen master to his pupil. In both cases the result was a disintegration of the 
self, but one route led to madness while the other led to enlightenment, The difference lay in the 
fact that enlightenment was the explicit goal of Zen practice and the master could help the pupil 
along the way, while double binds were unintended and, according to Bateson, a key feature was 
that the parties were somehow forbidden to mention them. The schizophrenic thus experienced an 
incipient disintegration of the self without any context in which to recognise this, and the 
unbearable inner experience of schizophrenia could thus be understood in terms of an inner 
struggle to hang onto the modern form—the modern, autonomous self-contained self. 
 
Several points interest me about this analysis. One is that it takes us back to the earlier stages of 
this essay. There I argued that dualism was consequential for how we go on in science and 
engineering—we engage in projects like dominating the Mississippi which aim to affirm and 
intensify a practical dualism of people and things. Bateson’s analysis of schizophrenia encourages 
us to think along the same lines about selves: the modern autonomous self not as given in nature, 
but as something created and maintained with difficulty—and, again, at the price of potential 
catastrophe—madness as the Hurricane Katrina of the soul. 
                                            
15 Laing later recalled that in his early days working in mental hospitals doctors were forbidden to converse 
with schizophrenics, for fear of encouraging them in their delusions. 
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Second, this story invites us to think about what is, in fact, a much broader phenomenon—the 
association one finds very often, if not always, between non-dualist projects and Eastern 
spirituality. Here Buddhism offers a non-dualist analysis of the self that proved entirely congenial 
to the non-dualism of cybernetic psychiatry, but also supplemented it with a vision of the world 
as a more wonderful place than modernity can articulate (enlightenment, the inner voyage). It 
served, one might say, to glamorise, in a non-pejorative sense, the unknown world to which the 
brain continually adapts. Another side of this is what I think of as the hylozoism of cybernetics, a 
spiritually-charged awe at the endless liveliness and performativity of matter itself, though I will 
let that thread go for now. I should simply note that in building up this non-dualist assemblage, 
certain forms of spirituality can find an integral place (unlike, as Latour puts it, the Crossed-Out 
God of modernity, indefinitely distant from the mundane world). 
 
Third, the Foucauldian echoes of the above are evident. One thinks of his notion of technologies 
of the self: specific personal and social disciplines and practices that go into the production of 
specific kinds of free-standing, autonomous agents (Foucault 1988). I can just remark here that 
one can take this notion of technology very literally, though the technologies we need to think 
about aimed at the dissolution rather than the creation of autonomous selves. Aldous Huxley’s 
Heaven and Hell, for example, is a veritable catalogue of consciousness-altering technologies, 
many of them chemical (mescaline, LSD), but also including starvation, chanting, flagellation and 
what have you. These technologies all point both to a decentred, nondualist, nonautomous 
conception of the self—a self that is out of control—and to the production of the same in union 
with a material other.16 
 
One such technology of the self, flicker, interests me especially as emerging from a cybernetic 
matrix (Geiger 2003). It turns out that if one gazes with eyes closed into a stroboscope flickering 
at a rate near the alpha frequency of the brain one sees fascinating geometrical patterns of moving 
coloured lights, and some people (not including me, alas) see visions. Grey Walter investigated 
the connection between flicker and EEG readings at considerable length in the 1940s and 1950s, 
and the phenomenon gained the attention of William Burroughs and the Beat writers and artists 
via Walter’s 1953 book, The Living Brain. The Beats understood flicker as a drug-free route to 
                                            
16 We could put Huxley et al on a trajectory running from William James (1902), The Varieties of Religious 
Experience up to The Future of the Body (Murphy 1992) as a continuation into New Age. For a fascinating 
scholarly study of drugs and music as technologies of the self, see Gomart and Hennion (1999) and Gomart 
(2002). 
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altered states, and one of them, Brion Gysin, actually sought to market Dream Machines, as he 
called them, as an alternative to the living-room TV. Evidently he didn’t succeed, but what 
interests me here is the contrast between a Dream Machine and a TV. Potential marketers just 
couldn’t decide what a Dream Machine was—just what category should it fit into, what should 
they sell it as? This clash with the demarcations of modern popular culture once more emphasises 
the strangeness of non-dualist artefacts, and once more one can think in terms of ontological 
theatre. If the TV stages for us a dualist image of people and things (with people now as passive 
consumers of whatever the TV has to offer), then the Dream Machine stages for us instead a 
nondualist coupling: visions as the joint product of the engaged brain and the machine. 
 
This line of thought can continue for a long way. Walter’s technical interest in flicker began in his 
research on epilepsy. A colleague devised a feedback device that made it possible to couple the 
flicker frequency to the specific alpha frequencies induced in the subject’s brain—a beautifully 
decentred and non-dualist set-up in which the brain controlled the light which controlled the brain 
and so on round the loop. This device made it possible to induce epileptic symptoms in more than 
50% of the subjects it was tried on. On a less horrifying note, EEG feedback got swept up into the 
1960s as biofeedback: a means for subjects to monitor their own brain states and train themselves 
to produce alpha waves, which by then had become associated with transcendental inner states. 
Besides giving the alpha frequencies a bad reputation in the years that followed, this led in turn to 
the development of biofeedback music, which used an EEG readout to control various sound-
generating devices, the output of which helped the performer maintain a transcendental alpha-
state, and so on—a beautiful and hylozoist conception of what music is, very different from 
modern notions of composition by the sovereign artist. 
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BIOFEEDBACK MUSIC SET-UP: note the ‘alpha amp’ at the centre. 
 
• 
 
The arts 
Heidegger thought that only artists stood much chance of rescuing us from the perils of 
enframing. I am not too optimistic about that, which is why I have concentrated elsewhere until 
now. But still, the arts and entertainment are important, and I can say a bit about them now. My 
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impression is that a great deal of contemporary artwork has a non-dualist and even hylozoist 
character, but I am just going to mention a couple of examples that have come up in my research 
on the history of cybernetics. I have already mentioned de Kooning’s paintings and biofeedback 
music (which continues to this day, but with much less visibility than in the 60s); now I want to 
concentrate on the British cybernetician Gordon Pask (Pickering 2006). 
 
Pask built his first cybernetic machine as an undergraduate at Cambridge in the early 1950s. This 
was the Musicolour machine, a synaesthetic device that used the sound of a musical performance 
(converted into an electronic signal) to control a lightshow. The machine was sensitive to 
frequencies and rhythms, and, to simplify, one might imagine that the lowest notes controlled the 
blue lights and so on up the spectrum. But the defining feature of Musicolour was that it got 
bored, as Pask put it. Thresholds for firing given lights would rise as certain notes or rhythms 
were repeated and eventually the machine would cease to respond to them, thus encouraging the 
performer to try something new. We could go back to the topic of power here: if a skilled 
performer can in some sense dominate a conventional musical instrument and bend it to his or her 
will, this was not a possibility with Musicolour. With Musicolour the performer had to adapt to 
the machine, which was in turn adapting to whatever the performer had done so far. A 
Musicolour sound-and-light show was thus a symmetrical and emergent joint product of the 
human performer and the machine—something that neither of them could have achieved alone—
a beautiful piece of non-dualist ontological theatre, a revealing machine. 
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MUSICOLOUR 
 
Musicolour was the model for all of Pask’s subsequent work which went, in one direction, into 
the construction of increasingly sophisticated teaching and learning systems (starting with the 
forerunner of today’s Mavis Beacon typing trainer). Another direction was further into the arts. In 
1968, for instance, Pask exhibited his Colloquy of Mobiles, an assemblage of robots designated 
male and female which adapted to one another in a decentred fashion in uncertain matings 
mediated by sounds and lights. In the early 1960s Pask also collaborated with the radical 
playwright and producer Joan Littlewood in the development of a cybernetic theatre in which 
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feedback from the sudience would help to steer and construct the action in the real time of 
performance. Collaboration with Littlewood also led Pask’s career in an architectural direction, 
beginning with Littlewood’s projected Fun Palace in the early 1960s. Littlewood conceived the 
Fun Palace as a new sort of place, where people would go to be entertained, informed and 
educated, as well as to play games, make their own art, and so on—a ‘university of the streets’ 
was one description. Pask became chair of the Fun Palace’s cybernetics committee, where his 
distinctive contribution was to devise in detail how the building might be made adaptive—
somehow reconfiguring itself in response to emergent patterns of use and encouraging new ones, 
again on the model of Musicolour. Adaptive architecture is a fascinating theme in itself, coupling 
the built environment to its human users in a symmetrical fashion: Littlewood and Pask’s hope 
and expectation was that new human goals and desires would themselves emerge in the novel 
space of the Fun Palace.17 The contrast with conventional architecture as a fixed representation of 
pre-given aesthetic norms or social functions is once again clear.18 And I can’t resist returning to 
New Orleans at this point. The city’s vulnerability lay precisely in its inability to adapt to its 
environment. In the realm of fantasy, at least, Archigram’s Walking City would not have had the 
same problem with Katrina. 
 
 
 
                                            
17 The historical context for the Fun Palace was the so-called leisure problem—the idea (now lost!) that 
automation would make human labour increasingly redundant and that new activities might emerge in 
places like the Fun Palace to fill the gap—new people might come into being there. 
18 On the history of adaptive architecture in Britain one should also think of the Archigram group and the 
Fun Palace’s principal architect, Cedric Price (Sadler 2005). On US history, one would think of Nicholas 
Negroponte at MIT, a sometime colllaborator of Pask. The London Fun Palace was never built; the 
Pompidou Centre in Paris was a rather non-adaptive version of it. 
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THE FUN PALACE 
 
 
 
ARCHIGRAM: THE WALKING CITY 
 
• 
 
Organisation, management, politics 
I said earlier that there is something political about non-dualist objects and practices, in the sense 
that they instantiate and more generally echo back to us different ways to grasp the world and 
organise our lives from those characteristic of modernity. It is appropriate, therefore, to end this 
survey with a brief discussion of non-dualist approaches that engage explicitly with questions of 
organisation and politics.19 I have in mind here the work of Stafford Beer, another English 
cybernetician and the founder in the 1950s of a field that he called management cybernetics 
(Pickering 2004b). 
 
The ruling preoccupation of Beer’s work, in industry and later as an independent consultant, was 
how organisations could be coupled to their environments in an adaptive fashion, so that they 
could explore their worlds effectively and transform themselves accordingly. In the late 1950s 
and early 1960s this interest fed into Beer and Pask’s amazing projects in biological computing 
which hinged on harnessing naturally occurring adaptive systems to human enterprises—ponds as 
factory-managers, for example. This was entirely a spare-time activity for Beer and Pask and led 
                                            
19 This is also a thread in posthumanist STS: see almost all of Haraway’s writings, Latour (1993, 2004), 
Pickering (forthcoming a) as well as the present essay. But here I am trying to find inspiration outside the 
STS tradition. 
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nowhere at the time, though this approach has begun to re-emerge in recent years (Pickering 
forthcoming c). 
 
In the late 1960s, Beer developed a different approach to adaptive organisation. His Viable 
System Model (VSM) modelled information flows and transformations within the organisation on 
current knowledge of a highly adaptive biological system: the human brain and nervous system—
a model of the firm as a real cyborg, with humans and technological artefacts integrated on the 
plan of the brain, itself non-dualistically coupled to its environment. From a political angle, Beer 
claimed that the VSM was as democratic a form as possible, consistent with being able to speak 
of an integral organisation. The key point was that the different levels of the VSM, running from 
the upper levels of management (levels 4 and 5 below) to production units (level 1), were 
supposed to be coupled homeostatically—each level could veto proposals coming from other 
levels and experiment with different configurations in search of some mutual equilibrium, on the 
model of Ashby’s multiple-homeostat set-ups. (This in contrast, of course, with the usual linear 
model of orders flowing down a chain of command, and nothing flowing back up.) 
 
 
 
THE VSM (ON LEFT) IN ANALOGY WITH THE NERVOUS SYSTEM & BRAIN 
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The VSM proved much more succcessful in practice than biocomputing, and has many 
practitioners to this day. Beer’s most famous application of the model was to the reorganisation of 
the Chilean economy in the early 1970s under the Socialist government of Salvador Allende 
(brought to an abrupt halt by the Pinochet coup). 
 
In parallel with the VSM, Beer also developed an approach to collective decision-making that he 
called Team Syntegrity. Syntegration situated participants on the edges of an imaginary 
icosahedron, and each participant would engage in discussions of relevant topics with participants 
with whom they shared a vertex. These discusssions were orchestrated in several rounds (the first 
of which would concern what the topic for discussion was), so that deliberations could echo 
around the icosahedron and come back to their origins transformed. Beer claimed that 
syntegration was a perfectly democratic way of managing decision-making inasmuch as all of the 
edges and vertices of an icosahedron are equivalent, and that a profoundly non-dualist collective 
consciousness could emerge in syntegration, with the final conclusions independent of any given 
participant. As ontological theatre, syntegration also thematised emergence, defining in advance 
only an empty form with the expectation that novelty would emerge in the process of syntegration 
itself. 
 
 
 
THE SYNTEGRATION ICOSAHEDRON 
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Beer’s diagrams of democracy—the VSM and the syntegration icosahedron—interest me a lot. 
From one angle, they are very concrete proposals for how to organise our lives, in terms of 
symmetric power relations and decision-making procedures. On the other hand, they make no 
foundational assumptions about what people are like and what they want—these emerge in 
processes within the systems. Again there is a striking contrast with conventional forms of 
politics, where, for example, the best one can hope for is an electoral choice between a couple of 
predefined alternatives. Again, ontology makes a visible difference in practice.20 
 
• 
 
To conclude: this essay has taken on a more linear form than I expected. The plot turns out to go 
like this. My concern has been with a specific dualism of people and things that, following 
Latour, I see as particularly salient in science and technology studies, and with an associated 
conceptualisation of modernity. Of course, we can usually tell the difference between people and 
things in a commonsense fashion, but the dualism at issue here is one that would understand the 
two terms—the human and the nonhuman—differently, as in the modern natural and social 
sciences. The argument from STS was that if one explores the heartland of modernity—modern 
physics, for example—one finds that the dualist separation does not stand up in practice, that key 
features of cultural extension hinge upon a constitutive and dynamic coupling of the human and 
the nonhuman. Neither term has its own pure dynamics; something important disappears when we 
try to hold them apart. 
 
The temptation then is to claim that dualism has been shown to be false in the hardest of hard 
cases; that duality is the false consciousness of modernity, a veil cast over the world and us in it. I 
think that’s right to a degree, but I have tried to go further. The metaphor of the veil is too 
passive; it cannot speak to the generative aspects of modernity. The modern sciences have as their 
telos a remaking of the world as more dual. I talked about the production of free-standing 
machines and instruments; there is also a sense in which the telos of science is the production of 
free-standing knowledge—knowledge that appears to inhere in the world itself, independent of its 
human creators; and later I have talked about the modern autonomous self. The products of 
                                            
20 There are interesting connections to Eastern spirituality in Beer’s work: he practised and taught Tantric 
yoga; the VSM was envisaged as a recursive structure and in his later writings Beer made it clear that it 
extended upwards to encompass the cosmos (as accessible in meditative practice), and he was very keen on 
the fact that the syntegration icosahedron embraced  the mystical figure of the enneagram. From another 
angle, there is an interesting connection from Beer’s cybernetics to music. Brian Eno recalls that it was a 
key moment in his career when he read Beer’s Brain of the Firm (1972). 
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science (and enginering, and all sorts of other activities) thus speak to us of a dualism that wasn’t 
there in the first place. 
 
We thus inhabit a world in which the highest status activities both presume and intensify a dualist 
ontology, and in which an ever-growing array of material and social objects stage that same 
ontology as we move through them and interact with them. This is my analysis of the power and 
hegemony of dualist modernity over our imaginations—of why we tend to approach the next 
situation from a dualist stance. 
 
Like Heidegger, I worry about this hegemony, though perhaps in a different way. It constricts our 
imaginations, narrows our practical options and increasingly seems to leave us with no alternative 
to heroic but grim domination projects, with catastrophe and disaster as the inevitable other side. I 
don’t think we need to remain in this grey, joyless and desperate space and I have tried to show 
that by listing examples of non-dualist practices and objects from recent history up to the present, 
from science, mathematics, engineering, robotics, brain science and psychiatry, the arts, 
entertainment and architecture, spirituality, organisation and politics. 
 
What am I doing with this list? Most obviously, I want to show that we do not have to be dualist, 
always, all the time. There are other ways to go on. Beyond Latour’s maxim that ‘we have never 
been modern’ I want to show that there are nonmodern practices and objects that Latour (2004) 
himself seems never to have imagined. I also want to suggest that we should take these seriously, 
which is why I have emphasised fields of nonmodern science and engineering, psychiatry and 
organisations—and, from another angle, why I have indicated a few times that cybernetic 
artefacts inevitably look strange, puzzling and amusing as we try to fit them into a dualist grid. I 
can see no reason why we shouldn’t treat Dream Machines as everyday objects which we might 
either like or dislike, but the very idea of them seems vaguely obscene and makes many people, 
including me, feel uncomfortable. And beyond that, the metaphor of the gestalt switch has 
become increasingly important to me as I have been writing, It is not simply that modern physics, 
say, displays for us a dualist way to proceed, or that its products echo dualism back to us. All of 
the elements of the modern dualist assemblage echo the same message back and forth between 
themselves, too, each reinforcing the other—this whole assemblage forms a coherent pattern, 
which we can then project onto all that falls outside it. This, I think is where the hegemony of 
dualism finds its strength. What I have been trying to do, then, is to conjure up a counter-pattern, 
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gesturing at this and that and trying to show how the bits fit together in a non-dualist picture, in 
which dualist modernity can find its place as a finite zone, not the whole thing. 
 
Have I succeeded? Probably not. If mainstream physicists can make fun, as they do, of 
complexity theory, what chance does a Dream Machine stand against a particle accelerator? Is the 
whole exercise therefore a waste of time? I would like to think not, and I find some sort of solace 
in the fact that in living memory dualism was severely tested in popular culture. A large segment 
of the Western world did once adopt a non-dualist form of life and with great enthusiasm and joy, 
for a decade or so. I refer, of course, to the 60s, and the so-called counterculture in particular. The 
whole interest in altered states of consciousness, for example, and the technologies of the self (not 
called that) that went with them, points to the counterculture’s radically non-dualist aspect. It is 
not inconceivable, then, that something like this could happen again. 
 
Is the idea, then, that we should go back to the 60s? Personally, I wouldn’t mind, but no. On the 
one hand, one can never go back; on the other, in retrospect the counterculture appears 
structurally very weak—focussed too much on the self and the senses, the arts, style, fashion. 
Hence my focus here on a broader range of topic: the sciences, engineering, architecture, 
organisations, as well as the arts, spirituality, psychiatry, altered states. If we could put all of this 
stuff together next time around, perhaps we could construct a more robust gestalt, a real challenge 
to the hegemony of dualism. 
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